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Lawyers, Symbols, and Money: Outside
Investment in Law Firms
Milton C. Regan, Jr.*
Two recent developments have startled some people who follow the
legal profession. The first was in May 2007, when the Australian law
firm of Slater & Gordon engaged in an initial public offering ("IPO") and
became listed on the Australian stock exchange.' The second occurred at
the end of October 2007, when the United Kingdom ("UK") passed
legislation allowing non-lawyer investors to acquire interests in law
firms in England and Wales.2
A law firm with non-lawyer owners provides a sharp contrast with
what I call the classic partnership model of the firm. The difference
between the two is basic; they represent differences in kind, not simply
of degree. From the perspective of the classical partnership, outside
3
investment is fundamentally incompatible with the traditional character
of the legal profession.
I don't think this is the most useful comparison, however, in
evaluating the prospect of outside investment in law firms. As I describe
below, firms over the past twenty-five years increasingly have departed
from the classic partnership model in substance, even as they largely
have remained partnerships in form. We can loosely characterize this as
a movement toward more of a corporate organizational model.
In considering the benefits and costs of outside investment in law
firms, we need to compare a law firm with outside investors with the
firm of today, which is a mixture of partnership and corporation. How
different would a firm with outside investment be from the modem
hybrid firm? Is outside investment simply the next logical step in the
* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for the Study of the Legal Profession,
Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Matthew Smith for his superb
research assistance on this article.
1. Alexia Garamfalvi, In a First, Law Firm Goes Public, LEGAL TIMES, May 22,
2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1179751700602.
2. Legal Services Act, c. 29 (2007), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2007/pdf/ukpga-20070029_en.pdf.
3. By "outside" investment, I mean equity investment by non-lawyer investors.
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evolution of the law firm? Or would it be a watershed moment that
fundamentally changes the legal profession? Should the United States
follow the lead of Australia, England, and Wales, or should it draw the
proverbial line in the sand and insist that only lawyers may own law
firms?
It is possible that few, if any, major law firms may take advantage
of authority to raise capital from outside investors. Firms that do so may
be those that represent mainly individuals, as is the case with Slater &
Gordon. Even so, permitting outside investment could change the terms
of the debate on regulation of the legal profession. Specifically, it could
prompt a more vigorous discussion of whether self-regulation should
give way to a regulated industry model. The result could be a more
sophisticated discussion about the complex interplay between financial
and professional demands, and greater focus on the practice entity rather
than the individual lawyer.
Such a discussion is long overdue. There has been ample criticism
for some time that relying heavily on self-regulation provides too much
opportunity for self-interested behavior and too little consideration of
important social values served by the practice of law.4 Restricting both
law firm ownership and professional regulation to lawyers rests on and
perpetuates the assumption that only lawyers are fit to determine the
obligations to which they will be subject. Self-ownership of the firm
thus mirrors self-regulation of the profession. It ostensibly provides a
small-scale model of how lawyers as a group can be trusted to govern
themselves.
This approach is inapt in a world in which lawyers increasingly are
viewed as but one group of professional service providers among many.
As Laurel Terry has documented, a substantial amount of state, federal,
and transnational regulation reflects the adoption of an emerging
paradigm in which "the legal profession is not viewed as a separate,
unique profession entitled to its own individual regulations, but is
included in a broader group of 'service providers,' all of whom can be
regulated together. ' '5 This paradigm demands that if lawyers desire
distinctive treatment, they need to be prepared to explain specifically
why this is necessary in order to protect client or social interests.6
To appreciate how permitting non-lawyer ownership could spark a
debate about professional regulation, it's helpful to examine the
characteristics of the classic partnership, the supposed rationales for its
4. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 143-83 (2000).
5. Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of
Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers," 2008 PROF. LAW. 189, 189.
6. Id. at21.
[Vol. 27:2
LAWYERS, SYMBOLS, AND MONEY
existence, and the ways in which it purports to strike a balance between
financial goals and professional values. Next, we need to consider the
forces that have prompted firms to move away from this model, and the
specific ways in which they've done so. Finally, we need to explore how
these changes have affected law firms' ability to balance financial goals
and professional values, and the extent to which a self-regulatory model
adequately addresses this state of affairs.
In what follows, I offer a few preliminary thoughts on these issues.
My focus will be on major law firms that provide services to corporate
clients, not on smaller law practices that provide services to individuals.
I think that the argument for the availability of outside investment capital
in the latter setting may be especially strong, because of its potential to
further the provision of more cost-effective and widely accessible legal
services for individuals.7 I focus on large law firms because the issue of
non-lawyer ownership is more complex in that sector, and because that
issue serves as an important vehicle for addressing the broader question
of how the legal profession should be regulated.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Australia
I'll start with Australia, and describe what has happened there. I'm
going to focus on the New South Wales legislation and regulations,
which most other Australian states have followed. 8 The Legal Profession
Act ("LPA") enables providers of legal services to register as
Incorporated Legal Practices ("ILPs") with the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission.9 The ILP is then governed by its articles, the
LPA and regulations adopted under it, and the nationwide Corporations
Act.10 The latter gives the ILP access to the full range of fundraising
options that are available to other business corporations.
Law firm partners become "solicitor directors" of the ILP, and
remain subject to professional obligations.1 ' To the extent that the LPA
or regulations conflict with the Corporations Act, the LPA is to prevail.
12
7. See generally UK DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFF. THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES: PUTTING CONSUMERS FIRST (2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
Iegalsys/folwpsml .pdf.
8. Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices-A New Era
in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN STATE INT'L
L. REV. 671 (2004).





PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Thus, for instance, an ILP must comply with financial reporting
requirements in the Corporations Act. 13 At the same time, its lawyers
have duties of confidentiality that limit what they can disclose. 14 The
result is that there is an exception to ILPs' securities disclosure
obligations for any information that a lawyer is required to keep
confidential.
An ILP must have at least one solicitor director responsible for
management of the legal services provided by the firm.15  It is
professional misconduct for any solicitor director not to ensure that
"appropriate management systems" are in place to enable provision of
legal services: (1) in accordance with the professional obligations of
practitioners and (2) so that the obligations of Australian lawyers who
are officers or employees of the practice are not affected by the behavior
of non-lawyer officers or employees.16 The solicitor director must take
steps to ensure that breaches of professional obligations do not occur and
that remedial action is taken if they do.
17
The solicitor director is liable for disciplinary action for an ILP's
inadequate management system, disciplinary breaches by any lawyer
employed by the ILP, the conduct of non-lawyer directors of the ILP that
adversely affects the provision of legal services, and the unsuitability of
any non-lawyer director of the ILP to be a director of a corporation that
provides legal services.18
In each state, the entity responsible for regulating the legal
profession takes main responsibility for auditing ILPs' compliance with
requirements of the LPA and Regulations. 19 The College of Law has
13. Mark & Cowdroy, supra note 8, at 679-80.
14. See, e.g., THE LAW SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, PROF'L CONDUCT AND
PRACTICE RULES R. 3.1, available at http://www.lawsociety.com.au/page.asp?
PartID=574 (stating "[a] practitioner must never disclose to any person, who is not a
partner director or employee of the practitioner's firm any information, which is
confidential to a client and acquired by the practitioner or by the practitioner's firm
during the client's engagement .... ); see also Legal Profession Act § 703, 2004, No.
113 (Austl.-N.S.W.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consolact/
lpa2004179/s703.html (stating "[tihe Law Society Council may make rules for or with
respect to engaging in legal practice as a solicitor").
15. Mark & Cowdroy, supra note 8, at 681.
16. Id. at 686-87.
17. See id. at 689-92.
18. Id. at 686-87.
19. For instance, in New South Wales, the Office of the Legal Services
Commissioner is responsible for auditing ILPs for compliance. See Legal Profession Act
2004 § 670, No. 113 (Austl.-N.S.W.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/
nsw/consol act/lpa2004179/s670.html. In Queensland, auditing is conducted by the
Legal Services Commission. See Legal Profession Act 2007, § 130 (Austl.-Queensland),
available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2007/07AC024.pdf. In
Western Australia, audits are conducted by the Legal Practice Board. See Legal Practice
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taken the lead in developing Law Best Practices based on LAW 9000
Quality Management. In collaboration with SAI Global, it then certifies
firms who meet these standards, with such certification satisfying firms'
obligations under the LPA and Regulations. °
The first Australian law firm to take advantage of the ability to
solicit non-lawyer investors was Slater & Gordon.21 This firm litigates
on behalf of consumers, workers, and plaintiffs in class action personal
injury lawsuits. 2 The firm was founded in 1935, and has litigated
several major cases against corporate defendants.23 At the time of its
public offering, Slater & Gordon had 140 lawyers in several offices
throughout Australia. 4 It projected $58 million in revenue and $9
million in profits for the fiscal year in which the offering occurred. 5
Prior to the stock offering, a handful of key lawyers (the "vendor"
shareholders) owned shares in the firm. 26 The shares were based on
personal capital contributions that these lawyers had made to fund
litigation by the firm. Such funding was necessary because Slater &
Gordon and other personal injury and plaintiffs' class action firms
27represent many clients under a conditional fee arrangement. As is the
case under a contingent fee agreement in the United States, lawyers who
operate under a conditional fee arrangement in Australia generally do not
collect fees in cases in which their clients are not successful. If a case is
successful, the lawyer is entitled to its ordinary fees plus a percentage of
those fees-as opposed to a percentage of the recovery as would be the
case if it were a contingent fee in the United States. A firm such as
Slater & Gordon thus can incur substantial costs on matters, which it will
recover only at the end of the case, often only if the litigation is
successful.
Act 2003, § 68 (Austl.-W. Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/
consol_act/lpa2003120/s68.html.
20. See The Law Society of New South Wales, Law 9000/QL Best Practice,
http://www.lawsociety.com.au/page.asp?PartlD=5936#anchor47124 (last visited Sep. 20,
2008); SAL, Legal Best Practice, http://www.sai-global.com/assuranceservices/
certification/Law9000/ (last visited October 20, 2008); The College of Law, Centre for
Best Practice, http://www.collaw.edu.au/cbp/index.asp (last visited October 20, 2008);
Kellie Harpley, Quality Assured? The New Law 9000 Quality Assurance Program,
LAWYERS WKLY. ONLINE, Jan. 21, 2005, http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/articles/
Quality-assured-The-new-Law-9000-quality-assurance-system-z66318.htm.
21. See generally SLATER & GORDON LTD., PROSPECTUS (2007), available at
http://www.slatergordon.com.au/docs/prospectus/Prospectus.pdf.
22. Id. at 20.
23. Id.
24. Id at 26.
25. Id. at 11.
26. SLATER & GORDON LTD., supra note 21, at 15.
27. Id. at 23, 30, 86.
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The vendor shareholders owned 77.5 million shares, and an
Employee Stock Ownership Program ("ESOP") owned 12.5 million
shares at the time of the offering. In the stock offering, Slater & Gordon
sold 17.3 million of the vendor shares and issued 17.7 million new
shares, all of which were acquired by professional and institutional
investors.2 s The shares opened at $AUI per share, closed at $AUl.40,
and generated $AU49 million in proceeds. At the close of the offering,
vendor shareholders held 63% of the voting rights in the firm, while
outside investors held 37% (the ESOP has no voting rights).29
In an effort to ensure that key lawyers in the firm would remain in
place instead of simply cashing out, the prospectus provides that vendor
shareholders may sell no more than 20% of their shares each year for a
five-year period.30 Furthermore, such lawyers must maintain minimum
share ownership while they are at the firm that is equal to the lower of
five times annual salary or 20% of shareholdings at time of the IPO.31
The prospectus for the offering sets forth the firm's hierarchy of
duties:
Lawyers have a primary duty to the courts and a secondary duty to
their clients. These duties are paramount given the nature of the
Company's business as an Incorporated Legal Practice. There could
be circumstances in which the lawyers of Slater & Gordon are
required to act in accordance with these duties and contrary to other
corporate responsibilities and against the interests of Shareholders or
the short-term profitability of the Company.
32
Slater & Gordon has used the proceeds of the offering to acquire
several other small and mid-size firms in Australia, thus consolidating to
some degree the market for consumer, employee, and personal injury
plaintiffs' side litigation.33
B. United Kingdom
The UK Legal Services Act of 2007 contained several provisions
overhauling the legal services system in England and Wales. Relevant to
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id. at 86.
30. See id. at 38.
31. SLATER & GORDON, supra note 21, at 87.
32. Id. at 84.
33. See Legal Advice: Should you buy shares in a law firm?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.
21, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cftn?story-id=
11967043.
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my discussion is the section that authorizes "Alternative Business
Structures. 34
These structures had their origins in a report in December 2004 by
Sir David Clementi.35 Clementi was charged with studying "what
regulatory framework would best promote competition, innovation, and
the public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective and
independent legal sector., 36 Historically, there has been a variety of
restrictions in the UK on affiliations among different types of lawyers
and on the types of organizations in which lawyers can practice.
Among Clementi's recommendations was that the law permit
outside investment in law practices.37 This was seen in particular as a
way to consolidate and make more efficient the provision of legal
services to individuals who traditionally have been served by small "high
street" law offices. 38 Clementi suggested that "new investors might bring
not just new investment but also fresh ideas about how legal services
might be provided in consumer friendly ways. 39
The UK government adopted most of Clementi's recommendations
in legislation introduced in Parliament, which was signed as the Legal
Services Act.40 Among the provisions is the authorization of what is
known as "Licensed Bodies. '41 These are law practices in which a non-
lawyer is a manager or has an ownership or voting interest in the entity.42
These entities also may provide non-legal services.4 3
Licensed Bodies will be regulated by a licensing authority.44 This
will be either the newly-created Legal Services Board or a regulator
designated by the Board, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority
formed by the Law Society in the wake of the legislation. A licensed
body must have a Head of Legal Practice who is a lawyer, who is
responsible for ensuring that the firm and its lawyers comply with duties
imposed by the licensing authority and the Legal Services Act.45 The
licensed body also must have arrangements in place to ensure that
lawyers act in accordance with "professional principles" set forth in the
34. Legal Services Act, supra note 2, pt.5.
35. SIR DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL REPORT (2004), available at http://www.legal-
services-review.org.uk/content/report/report-chap.pdf.
36. Id. at 1.
37. See id. at 115; SLATER & GORDON, supra note 21.
38. CLEMENTI, supra note 35, at 3.
39. Id. at 115.
40. Legal Services Act, supra note 2.
41. CLEMENTI, supra note 35, at 42-43.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 42.
44. Id. at 43.
45. Id. at 53.
2008]
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46
act. These include the duties to: (1) act with independence and
integrity (2) maintain proper standards of work (3) act in the best interest
of the client (4) comply with the duty to the court to act with
independence in the interests of justice; and (5) maintain client
confidences.
The licensing authority must approve each non-lawyer's holding of
a "restricted interest" in a licensed body, even if the shares are publicly
traded.48 A "restricted interest" effectively is ownership of at least 10%
shares in a firm or the ability to exercise significant influence over
management by virtue of a share interest.4 9  A non-lawyer who is a
manager or who has an ownership interest must not cause or
substantially contribute to a breach by a licensed body or its lawyers of
duties imposed by licensing authority. 50
The criteria for approval of non-lawyer ownership interest are that
the interest does not compromise regulatory objectives, which include:
(1) protecting and promoting the public interest (2) supporting the
constitutional principle of the rule of law (3) improving access to justice
(4) protecting interests of consumers (5) promoting competition in the
provision of legal services (6) encouraging an independent, strong,
diverse, and effective legal profession (7) increasing public
understanding of citizens' legal rights and duties and (8) promoting and
maintaining adherence to the "professional principles" described
above.51 In addition, the ownership interest must not compromise the
licensed body's ability to fulfill duties imposed by the licensing
authority, and must be a "fit and proper" person to hold an interest in the
firm.
52
In response to a licensed body's application for non-lawyer
investment, the regulatory agency may: (1) object to non-lawyer
ownership interest, subject to appeal (2) impose conditions of approval
(3) order divestiture of an interest or (4) revoke or suspend a firm's
license to practice.
53
The authority to adopt alternative business structures is likely to go
into effect in 2011, once the new Legal Services Board is finally
46. Legal Services Act, supra note 2, c. 29, sched. 13, pt. 1, § 6 (referring to the
"regulatory objectives" set out in section 1 of the Legal Services Act, which includes the
professional principles).
47. Id. c. 29, pt. 1.
48. Id. c. 29 sched. 13, pt. 1, § 1.
49. Id. c. 29, sched. 13, pt. 1, §§ 2-3.
50. Id. c. 29, pt. 5, § 90.
51. Legal Services Act, supra note 2, c. 29, pt. 1.
52. Id., c. 29, sched. 13, pt. 1, § 6.
53. Id., c. 29, sched. 13, pt. 2, §§ 16-19.
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established.54 In the meantime, the Act authorizes Legal Disciplinary
Practices, which only provide legal services. These firms can have up to
25% non-lawyer managers who invest in the firm.55 The Solicitors
Regulation Authority can approve formation of these entities, and is
working on regulations to guide this process.56 The hope is that they will
be able to operate by as soon as March 2009.
II. UNITED STATES ETHICS RULES
Every jurisdiction in the United States has the equivalent of
American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rule 5.4. Rule 5.4(a) says
that a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer.
57
Rule 5.4(d) says that a lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a
professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a
profit if a non-lawyer owns any interest in it.58 The comments to Rule
5.4 make clear that these restrictions are intended to "protect the lawyer's
professional independence of judgment." 59 The concern is that investors
may pressure lawyers to subordinate the interests of the client or the legal
system in order to maximize financial returns to the firm.
The history of these restrictions dates back to the 1908 ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics. 60  Canon 33 prohibited partnerships
between lawyers and non-lawyers, while Canon 34 prohibited dividing
legal fees with non-lawyers. In 1961, ABA Ethics Opinion 303
interpreted Canon 33's prohibition of a partnership between lawyers and
non-lawyers to apply to any kind of organizational affiliation between
lawyers and non-lawyers. 61  When the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility was adopted in 1969, it continued the prohibition on
forming partnerships 62 and sharing fees with non-lawyers.
63
54. Frances Gibb, Who will police the lawyers now? Only a non-lawyer need
apply.... THE TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2007, available at http://business.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/business/law/colunmists/article2831496.ece.
55. See Solicitors Regulation Authority, Changes enabled by the Act-an overview,
§ 1.10, http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/consultations/340.article (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
56. See Solicitors Regulation Authority, Glossary of terms, http://www.sra.org.uk/
sra/consultations/339.article (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (defining term "Legal
Disciplinary Practice").
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Preface (1983), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/CanonsEthics.pdf.
61. MAINE PROF'L ETHICS COMM'N, Opinion No. 31 (Sept. 22, 1982), available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/Ethics%200pinions/Opinion%203 1.htm (discussing
ABA Ethics Opinion 303's holding that "if the salary of a non-lawyer employee were to
be based on a percentage of the firm's net profits, a division of legal fees would be
involved and Canon 34 would prohibit it").
62. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-103 (1969).
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In 1981, the Kutak Commission, charged with making
recommendations for the shift from the Model Code to the Model Rules,
proposed relaxing the prohibition of non-lawyer ownership. It
recommended that Rule 5.4 permit a lawyer to be employed by an
organization in which a financial interest is held or managerial authority
is exercised by a non-lawyer, as long as there is no interference with the
lawyer's independent professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship. 4 In support of this recommendation, the Comment to the
proposal said: "it is impractical to define organizational forms that
uniquely can guarantee compliance with the Rules of Professional
Conduct.,
65
The Kutak Commission's proposal was rejected by the ABA
membership.66 The key moment in the discussion apparently occurred
when the reporter for the Kutak Commission, Geoffrey Hazard, was
asked whether the proposed rule would permit Sears to open a law
office.67  He answered that it would, and that doomed the
recommendation.68
The ABA's rejection of the Kutak Commission's proposal, as well
as continuing opposition to outside investment in law firms, implicitly
reflects commitment to what I call the classical partnership model of the
firm. It is therefore worth looking more closely at that model, the
assumptions on which it is based, and the conditions under which it can
flourish.
III. THE CLASSIC PARTNERSHIP MODEL
A. Basic Elements
In the classic partnership model of the law firm, the law firm is a
voluntary association of lawyers-and only lawyers-who agree to share
the risks and rewards of a common venture. Partners are owners of the
firm, as opposed to its employees. They contribute capital to the firm as
needed. Furthermore, they don't receive a specified salary, but share in
63. Id. DR 3-102 (1969).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (Proposed Final Draft 1981)
[hereinafter MODEL RULE 5.4 PROPOSAL]; JOHN S. DzIENKOWSKI & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
LEGAL ETHICS-THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 5.4-3
(2008).
65. MODEL RULE 5.4 PROPOSAL, supra note 64, at 83.
66. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board? A
Proposalfor Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1998).
67. DZIENKOWSKI & ROTUNDA, supra note 64, at § 5.4-3 (citing Rita H. Jenson,
Ethics Row Looms on [Law Firm] Affiliates, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 1, 28).
68. Id.
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the profits once the firm has satisfied its financial obligations. Under the
classic partnership model, the distribution of those profits is largely by
seniority-the lockstep system.69 At the same time, partners are jointly
and severally liable as individuals for the obligations of the firm. A
creditor of the firm can seek recovery from a partner's personal assets if
the firm's assets are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim.
The relationship among partners is governed by partnership law.70
For the most part, that body of law permits partners to determine their
rights and obligations toward the firm and toward each other by
agreement. Statutes set some boundaries on the terms of this agreement,
and partners are subject to the traditional common law principle that
partners have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the partnership and
to fellow partners.
Terminating a partner, for instance, is a complicated process under
the classic model.7' It must be authorized by the partnership
agreement.72  Even if authorized, it must be in good faith and not
"predatory. 73  If a partnership is at will rather than for a fixed term
(which almost all law firms are) when a partner is terminated or
withdraws, the firm must end its operations, wind-up its affairs, and form
a new partnership without the terminated partner.74 This typically
happens automatically through a provision in the partnership agreement.
This does not affect the firm's operations; it simply creates an accounting
distinction for purposes of allocating income among the partners. A firm
may dissolve and reform many times as partners withdraw or are
terminated. Notwithstanding its trivial substantive impact, this formality
persists as a residue of the classic partnership model.
The classic partnership model thus conceptualizes the law firm as a
voluntary association of partners who share equally in the outcomes of a
common venture, who participate as equals in self-governance through
consensus, and who owe distinctive responsibilities to one another. The
classic partnership is perhaps the paradigmatic example of organizational
69. See generally Paul C. Saunders, When Compensation Creates Culture, 19 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 295 (2006) (reviewing MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT You KILL: THE
FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004)).
70. See generally Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal
Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 393 (1998).
71. See generally Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Partner Expulsions: Fiduciary Duty
and Good Faith, 21 CARDOzo L. REv. 181 (1999).
72. Id. at 181.
73. See, e.g., Allan W. Vestal, Law Partner Expulsions, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1083, 1092-93 (1998).
74. See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General
Principles on the Duties of Partners, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 997, 1032-34 (1998).
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self-governance, which, as I describe below, provides a rationale for
professional self-governance as well.
B. Functions of the Classic Partnership Model
We can think of the classic partnership model as addressing three
concerns related to lawyer professionalism. The first is what David
Wilkins has called the "agency" problem: the risk that lawyers will harm
clients' interests.7 5  As agents, lawyers must remain faithful to their
clients, and refrain from pursuing their own interests at their clients'
expense.76
The second is the ability of individual lawyers to have a significant
measure of control over their work, with opportunities for each lawyer to
exercise his or her professional discretion. I have described this desire
for "craft autonomy" elsewhere.77 In the organizational setting, we can
think of this as another type of agency problem: ensuring that those who
run the firm do so in the interest of its lawyers rather than their own.
Thus, professionalism raises concerns about both a client agency
problem and a lawyer autonomy problem.
A final concern related to lawyer professionalism is what Wilkins
calls the "externality" problem.78 The concern here is the possibility that
"lawyers and clients together [will] impose unjustified harms on third
parties or on the legal framework." 79 In the most general terms, this
concern focuses on the need for lawyers to be sensitive to their role as
stewards of the legal system.
The classic partnership model theoretically addressed each of these
concerns. 80  With respect to the client agency problem, the model
provided some assurance that the client would receive high-quality legal
services. First, the prospect of personal liability gave each partner an
incentive to monitor the work of other lawyers in the firm. 81 Second,
lockstep compensation provided an incentive for partners to share
75. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 819-
20 (1992).
76. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of
Professionalism, 13 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 37 (1999).
77. See infra.
78. Wilkins, supra note 75, at 820.
79. Id.
80. See Royston Greenwood & Laura Empson, The Professional Partnership: Relic
or Exemplary Form of Governance?, 24 ORG. STUD. 909 (2003), available at
http://oss.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/6/909.
81. See Laura Empson, Surviving and Thriving in a Changing World: The Special
Nature of Partnership, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES NEW
PERSPECTIVES 10, 15 (2007); see generally Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner's
Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 329 (1995).
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knowledge and information with other lawyers in the firm, thereby
enhancing the quality of the services that the firm provided.8 a
Furthermore, a lockstep system ideally served to align the individual
lawyer's interest with that of the firm. Individual decision-making was
less likely to be dominated by individual cost-benefit analysis because
individual marginal productivity was not the basis for financial
remuneration. The individual might still be tempted to subordinate the
client's interest to the economic interest of the firm as a whole, but the
individual payoff from doing was indirect and might be too small to
justify taking the risk. In addition, the "up or out" system ostensibly
provided clients with assurance that the firm was comprised of only the
very best lawyers. All these features operated to provide signals that
compensated for the fact that the quality of professional services is
difficult to evaluate.
Finally, professional socialization emphasized the lawyer's
fiduciary duty to the client. The fact that the firm was run only by
lawyers gave clients some assurance that decisions would be made by
persons who had internalized the ethos of devotion to the client, and who
would informally regulate behavior related to important issues such as
confidentiality and unconflicted representation.83
The classic partnership model addressed concerns about individual
lawyer autonomy and independence by giving partners a voice in the
operation of the firm. All managers of the firm were lawyers, which
eliminated the kind of "external" agency problem that exists between
shareholders and corporate executives.
To be sure, an internal agency problem remained, in that partners in
the firm had to monitor the partners to whom they delegated authority.
These agency costs were minimized, however, because partners were
relatively sophisticated and knowledgeable monitors, and they had
opportunities to influence the partner-managers because of working in
close proximity to them. The firm therefore was able to use informal
collegial monitoring as a substitute for more costly systems of formal
control that characterize other major economic organizations. 84
With respect to regulating externalities, the classic partnership
relied in part on the norm that a lawyer is an officer of the court and,
more generally, that he or she bears some responsibility for maintaining
the integrity of the legal system. The scope of this norm has always been
a source of some contention within the profession, and the neutral
82. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 73, at 297.
83. See generally Lawrence J. Fox, Redefining Lawyers' Work: Multidisciplinary
Practice Old Wine in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence, 72 TEMPLE L.
REv. 971 (1999).
84. Empson, supra note 81, at 14-15.
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partisan model seems to have gained increasing influence in recent years.
Nonetheless, the fact that the firm was run and controlled by lawyers was
seen as the best way to realize the best hope that this norm would have
some influence. Individual lawyers ideally were socialized to accept it,
and a lawyer-run organization provided the opportunity for collective
reinforcement of it.
Lockstep compensation also purported to address the externality
problem. It was designed to minimize temptation for individual lawyers
to maximize their income by ignoring third party effects in pursuing
clients' aims. As with the potential client agency problem, a lawyer
might be tempted to ignore externalities in order to enhance the firm's
income, but the payoff from that would be smaller and less direct than if
he or she were compensated on the basis of individual productivity.
The partnership in its classic form thus appeared to provide some
assurance that the ideals of the profession would not be eroded by the
rise of law firms whose size dwarfed what had come before. The ability
of the firm to serve as a self-governing organization of lawyers signaled
that society could continue to trust lawyers as a whole to regulate
themselves with the interests of clients and the public in mind.
The classic partnership model was particularly well-suited to the
oligopolistic market for legal services that largely prevailed until the
early 1980s. 85 Oligopolistic firms have considerable ability to set prices,
face only mild pressures for improving efficiency, and have the latitude
to structure their operations with some non-financial considerations in
mind. They can eschew the unseemly overt competition and explicit
acknowledgement of financial goals that characterize firms more directly
subject to market forces. The fact that firms in this era seemed to offer a
credible claim that they were guided by considerations beyond pure self-
interest made professional self-regulation appear to be a tenable strategy
for governing the conduct of lawyers. To reiterate an earlier point, the
capacity for organizational self-regulation provided assurance of the
viability of professional self-regulation.
C. Cracks in the Model
As is well-known, the market for legal services has become
significantly more competitive over the past three decades in ways that
do not require extensive reiteration here. Although most law firms
formally remain partnerships, they have departed from the classic
partnership model in several ways. In some cases, these departures have
85. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Professionalism: A Review of Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in
the American Legal Profession, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 1002-08 (1984).
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occurred because this model could not respond to the practical needs of
firms in a competitive market. In other cases, the changes necessary to
respond to market pressures have reconfigured firms in ways that the
classic partnership model cannot accommodate. 86  In either case, the
combined result is that: (1) the classic partnership model no longer
describes significant features of law firms and (2) for those classic
features that remain, that model has a much less credible claim that it
adequately addresses the concerns of professionalism.
One source of pressure on the classic model is that firms have
grown much larger over the last generation, with multiple offices
domestically and overseas. This of course makes informal collegial
control more difficult. It requires greater reliance on more specialized
management structures, which increases internal agency costs. In
addition, it makes full involvement in decision-making a much less
realistic ambition. This loss in voice can reduce commitment to the firm
and incentives to share knowledge. The average modem law firm also
now contains a greater diversity of practice areas than in the past, which
may make consensus harder to achieve and expectations less predictable.
Firms now face significant pressures from clients to provide legal
services more efficiently.87 As firms compete on this basis, they are
beginning to disaggregate legal work into more discrete tasks and to
assign each task to the lowest-cost provider both inside and outside the
firm, whether these are lawyers or non-lawyers. Competitive pressures
have shortened what we might call the "legal services lifecycle." In the
course of this lifecycle, a legal service or practice area first emerges as
distinct and innovative, which means that it can be priced at a premium.
Over time, competitive pressures push toward disaggregation of the work
into more routine components requiring less skill.88 Eventually, with
enough experience and competition, the service or practice area becomes
a commodity, with low profit margins and fierce competition based
mainly on price. The window during which a first mover in a service
area can gain above market profits therefore is steadily shrinking.
86. For a succinct description of the forces that are placing pressure on the
partnership form in professional services firms generally, see Empson, supra note 81, at
16-18.
87. See, e.g., Rees Morrison, Ten Ways to Analyze Outside Counsel Spending,
N.Y.L.J., May 23, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=
900005481569#; Eriq Gardner, Pfizer Litigators Endure Beast of a Beauty Contest,
CORP. COUNS., Oct. 13, 2005, available at http://www.nelsonmullins.com/news/nelson-
mullins-articles-speeches-detail.cfm?id=50; Posting of John Earnhart, Cisco General
Counsel on State of Technology in the Law to http://blogs.cisco.com/news/comments/
cisco.generalcounsel_ onstate of technology in the law/ (Jan. 25, 2007, 14:13 EST).
88. See DAVID MAISTER, MANAGING THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRM 21-30 (1993).
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This places a greater premium on formal operational and monitoring
systems. The greater the disaggregation of a service into discrete tasks,
the more amenable that service is to the application of standard formal
procedures and reliance on technology. By contrast, the informal
collegial control that characterizes the classic partnership model is less
efficient and produces less predictable outcomes for many tasks. While
judgment and discretion remain important in determining how to
assemble and interpret the various components of an engagement, the
percentage of the project that requires these attributes may be relatively
small. Large chunks of work can even be delegated to persons outside
the firm, such as contract lawyers in the United States or abroad.
Competitive pressures also can generate increasing need for law
firm capital. One source of this need is to pay for the information
technology that enables firms to rationalize and provide services more
efficiently. Another is the desire to open more offices overseas, whose
delayed profitability current partners may not be willing to subsidize
through capital contributions or lower claims on profits. Still another
impetus for more capital is to be able to fund the acquisition of lawyers,
practice groups, or entire firms as part of an expansion strategy. A
partnership's capital base is limited to the wealth of its partners, and its
assets are mobile. A firm thus may feel the need to look to other sources
of capital to fund its operations.
As is well known, law firm compensation systems have moved
toward more performance-based models that feature less income-sharing
and risk diversification. 89 This elevates the potential significance of
individual cost-benefit calculations in influencing behavior.
Today's law firm also typically includes multiple categories of
lawyers, rather than simply partners who own the firm and employees
who don't. The number and proportion of non-equity, or income,
partners, as well as other categories of permanent salaried lawyers, has
grown significantly in recent years.90 In addition, even equity partners
are subject to potential loss of equity status or expulsion, and may be
treated in some cases as employees, rather than owners, for employment
discrimination purposes. 9' Firms now include a much larger percentage
of lawyers who are employees who have no opportunity to become
owners. This shrinking prospect of equity partnership can limit
commitment to the firm and reduce motivation to do good work, while
89. See generally Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry Into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313 (1985).
90. See generally William Henderson, Single-Tier versus Two-Tier Partnership
Tracks at Am Law 200 Law Firms: Evidence and Theory, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691 (2006).
91. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
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the decline of an up or out policy may weaken the firm's ability to signal
the quality of its lawyers.
Finally, virtually every firm has moved to eliminate partner joint
and several liability by adopting a limited liability organizational form.
This is a response to the increasing scale of the modem law firm,
acknowledgment of diminishing ability to rely on informal collegial
controls on behavior, and, with a highly active lateral market, probably
less commitment to the firm as an institution for sharing risks and
rewards.
The realities of law firm practice today therefore do not comport
with the assumptions that underlie the classic partnership model. That
model's reliance on collegial controls is ill-suited to address a more acute
internal agency problem. Its reliance on consensus decision-making is
too cumbersome for a fast-paced competitive market. Its assumption of
unlimited personal liability is at odds with a reduced sense of individual
commitment to the firm, and seems unfair in light of the inability of
partners to monitor all their colleagues' work. Its reliance on informal
supervision and maximum individual autonomy is in conflict with the
effort to standardize legal tasks, to provide cost-efficient service, and to
minimize risks of liability.
Thus, even if today's law firms remain partnerships in form, they
have departed significantly from the classic partnership model. Firms
are moving closer to a corporate model: distinct separation of ownership
and control, multiple categories of workers and lines of authority, greater
standardization of tasks, productivity-based compensation, limited
individual liability, and reliance on temporary workers that mimics
corporate "just in time" production processes.
One major component of the classic partnership model remains,
however, because it is required by law: ownership of law firms only by
lawyers. 92 Does this make sense? Is non-lawyer ownership the line in
the sand that we must not cross, or the next natural evolutionary step?
One way to approach this issue is to ask what the implications of non-
lawyer ownership might be for law firms' ability to address traditional
concerns about client agency costs, individual lawyer autonomy, and
externalities to which the classic partnership model purported to be a
response.
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007).
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IV. CONCERNS ABOUT OUTSIDE INVESTMENT
A. Client Agency Concerns
One argument against allowing a law firm to sell shares to the non-
lawyers is that lawyers will be caught in a conflict between their
fiduciary duties to shareholders and their fiduciary duties to clients. In
particular, we might fear that lawyers who do not act to maximize share
price because of client interests might be sued by shareholders for breach
of their duty of loyalty. This may be a particular concern if the law firm
is publicly traded. It is an impossible position to put lawyers in, the
argument goes, so we just should avoid it by not allowing law firms to
sell shares.
This is an impossible position for a lawyer to be in. If this were our
only choice, selling shares would be a bad idea. There's nothing,
however, that says that shareholders are entitled to the same degree of
devotion as clients. Shareholders have rights that are defined to a large
degree by the securities that the company issues. A common
shareholder, for instance, ordinarily isn't entitled to dividends unless the
directors choose to pay them. Some shares have voting rights; others
don't; some do with respect to certain issues.
A law firm's prospectus, therefore, could have a provision similar to
the one that Slater & Gordon prepared. 93 As I've described above, the
description of risks in the firm's prospectus states that the firm's duties
are, in order of priority: to the court, to clients, and to shareholders.
Fulfilling the first two duties may require subordinating the interest of
shareholders in certain situations. Futhermore, as in Australian
legislation authorizing Incorporated Legal Practices,94 a rule or statute
permitting law firms to have outside investors could state explicitly that
ethics rules have priority in any instance in which they conflict with
obligations under corporate law.
In this way, ethics rules in a sense would be incorporated into the
duties of law firm directors and officers. This would preserve lawyers'
traditional fiduciary obligations, and prevent them from having to choose
between those and duties to shareholders. Shareholders would be on
notice of these provisions, and the features of these securities presumably
would be taken into account in the price of the firm's shares in the
market.
But, someone might say, what if shareholders are unhappy with how
the directors are discharging their responsibilities-and mount an
93. See SLATER & GORDON LTD., supra note 21.
94. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 2004, supra note 19.
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election challenge to them? Won't directors always be vulnerable to
this? Won't the fear of it create the risk that lawyers will slight their
professional obligations?
The first, practical, answer to this is that the risk of being unseated
by a shareholder revolt is pretty remote in most publicly traded
enterprises. The SEC, for instance, has recently reaffirmed its rule that
shareholders can't force the company to put shareholder candidates for
the board on the company's proxy ballot.95  The risk of effective
shareholder electoral challenges in most companies thus is more
theoretical than real.
The second answer is that the law firm could issue only minority
shares to outside investors, vesting control in lawyers within the firm.
Non-lawyer shareholders wouldn't be in a position to intimidate directors
into violating their professional obligations. Google, for instance, has
issued dual class shares that give the founders voting rights
disproportionate to their shares in the firm compared to public
shareholders. 96 Indeed, the firm could issue only non-voting shares, as
was effectively the case in the Blackstone IPO. 97  The Blackstone
offering provides just one example of how a partnership can raise money
in the capital markets while ensuring that insiders retain control over the
entity.
But, someone might argue, in publicly traded firms shareholders
don't need to vote in order to exert influence-they just need to sell their
shares. If a law firm is listed on the stock exchange, it will want to keep
its share price up. In order to do that, it will need to keep shareholders
happy. Thus, shareholders can exert pressure on lawyers to satisfy
shareholders at the expense of clients-even if shareholders have a
minority interest or no voting rights at all. In terms of ethics rules, the
argument is that the lawyer will have a conflict of interest. Specifically,
the representation of a client may be "materially limited" by "a personal
interest of the lawyer" under Rule 1.7(a)(2). 98
There is always some risk that a lawyer will try to maximize his or
her own financial interest at the expense of the client. This is true of any
setting or organization in which a lawyer practices, from solo practitioner
to global law firm. Furthermore, law firms already put a great deal of
95. Proposed Rule: Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, SEC
Release No. 34-56161, 17 CFR, pt. 240 (July 27, 2008).
96. Elinor Mills, Google Sticks with Dual Class Structure, CNET NEWS, May 11,
2006, available at http://news.cnet.com/Google-sticks-with-dual-class-structure/2100-
10303-6071494.html.
97. See Susan Beck, The Transformers: Investors May be Able to Buy Their Stock,
But Fortress and Blackstone Don't Act Like Other Public Companies, AM. LAW. Nov. 1,
2007, at 94.
98. Model Rules Of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7(a)(2) (2007).
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emphasis on Profits per Partner ("PPP"). The AmLaw 100 is the
equivalent of the Dow Jones average for law firms. Would clients be
more at risk if share price replaces PPP as the scorecard?
The answer to that question depends on whether the change in the
audience from PPP to share price is likely to put clients at greater risk.
Who's the audience for PPP? Who makes decisions based on this
metric? Mainly, the audience consists of lawyers within a firm and
prospective laterals that it might attract from other firms. Clients and
law graduates might have some interest in this metric, but neither has an
especially important stake in pushing for a higher PPP in a particular
firm.
As an audience, lawyers are motivated by money as much as anyone
else. The fact that a person's sense of well-being tends to be powerfully
shaped by comparison with a perceived peer reference group means that
PPP rankings have the potential to spur behavior that is significantly
influenced by financial considerations. Lawyers are not, however,
completely one-dimensional. They also value things like professional
status, reputation, and satisfaction in their work. They won't necessarily
pursue money as the highest priority in every single situation-even
though the prominence of PPP may increase the percentage of instances
in which they do.
Now consider the audience for share price: investors and stock
analysts who provide them information. These folks are a bit more one-
dimensional. I may have a lot of different interests and values, but in my
role as an investor I'm pretty single-minded. I want a higher rather than
a lower return. A publicly traded firm may have to answer to an
audience that is less forgiving of a failure to maximize profits than does a
firm that is not publicly traded.
Is the difference one of degree or kind? There may be somewhat
greater temptation in a publicly traded firm, but is there enough that we
should categorically rule out permitting firms to sell shares? If the
difference is one of degree, how does the incremental increase in risk
compare to benefits that we believe non-lawyer investment would
provide? Finally, even if we believe that the gravitational pull of share
price makes publicly traded law firms a bad idea across the board, that
doesn't mean that private non-lawyer ownership also is misguided.
What about firms with outside ownership interests that are not
publicly traded, for whom there is no share price? How likely is it that
private investors will be able to exert pressure to compromise client
interests for the sake of financial returns? The firm can exercise some
control over this by structuring its securities so that owners are passive
investors. If prospective investors are aware that ownership does not
include any participation in governance, and that their interests may be
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superseded by the firm's duties to clients and the legal system, those who
choose to invest will have no legitimate expectation of being able to
influence decisions within the firm.
Even with passive investors, however, one concern may be that as a
practical matter investors' provision of capital to the firm will give them
some influence over it. This may be, but it is no different than is the case
now with lenders who provide funds to firms. Loan agreements typically
contain covenants establishing financial benchmarks for the firm that can
effectively constrain firms' freedom of action. Law firms that want to
avoid default may have to make choices that they would not make if they
did not have to satisfy the requirements of lenders. The pressure to do
so, of course, stems from the fact that law firms are obligated to pay their
debts. By contrast, they would have no responsibility to guarantee any
payments to shareholders.
Finally, one might argue that the market for legal services will
create disincentives for firms to slight the interests of clients. A firm that
subordinates client interest to its own financial gain risks long-term
economic ruin. Prospective clients will avoid a firm that acquires a
reputation for doing this. The argument is that a publicly traded firm will
be motivated to promote, rather than slight, its clients' interest, because
that's the best way to keep the share price high. This argument would
seem to have particular force with respect to firms with large corporate
clients that are able to look out for themselves. It may be less persuasive
with respect to firms with one-shot individual clients, although even in
these cases their dissatisfied clients can hurt the reputation of the firm.
B. Lawyer Agency Concerns
What might non-lawyer ownership mean for lawyers' ability to
exercise discretion, independent judgment, and control over their work?
First, we have to recognize that, even without non-lawyer investment,
firms have adopted a substantial number of measures that have subjected
lawyers to the type of organizational influence that is characteristic of a
corporate management model.
For instance, firms have concentrated management authority in
executive committees; hired non-lawyers for positions such as chief
administrative officer and chief marketing officer; established general
counsel positions; designated specific partners as ethics or loss
prevention counsel; created committees to resolve ethical issues;
established more formal lines of reporting among departments, practice
groups, and management committees; adopted more formal procedures
for identifying conflicts; imposed standard terms for engagement letters
with clients; required specific procedures for reviewing legal opinions
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and other work furnished by the firm; adopted performance metrics for
practice groups and individuals to guide internal investment and
compensation decisions; and now more systematically evaluate their
market position and business strategy. Furthermore, law firm insurers
press for systems, policies, and procedures that impose more uniform
standards of behavior within the firm.
All these developments have occurred in firms that formally remain
partnerships. They have been prompted by market forces, not by
organizational or capital structures. Would non-lawyer investment create
incentives for firms to intensify these efforts even more? If so, would
this culminate in serious intrusions on lawyers' exercise of professional
judgment?
To begin to answer this question, we need to appreciate that there is
an asymmetry in the impact of the measures that I've described. To put
it bluntly, lawyers who generate significant business as a practical matter
are less fettered by these measures than are other lawyers. Because firms
cannot enforce covenants not to compete nor penalize lawyers who leave
with clients in tow, they may have limited leverage over lawyers who
produce high revenues. 99 The result is that an active lateral market for
profitable partners constrains the firm's ability to impose policies across
the board. There is a limit to how far firms believe they can push. This
limit varies from firm to firm, but all firms must contend to some degree
with the threat of rainmaker exit.
A firm that wants to attract and retain non-lawyer investment will
need to limit the extent to which it is dependent on partners with minimal
commitment to the firm. Investors want stability and predictability,
which is threatened by wide swings in profitability produced by the exits
and entries of partners from a firm. They will prefer firms in which
clients are institutionalized and there is loyalty and cooperation, rather
those in which lawyers hoard clients, fight over client credit and refuse to
mentor juniors.
In order to serve as an attractive investment, a firm will need to rely
less on individual rainmakers and more on the performance of the firm as
a whole. It will need to devote resources to building organizational
capital rather than stockpiling a stable of profitable but mobile
rainmakers. This means adopting measures that integrate members more
securely within the firm, and taking steps to increase loyalty and
commitment to reinforce that integration. A firm that successfully does
this will build "firm-specific capital" that can deter exit by making it less
attractive. This in turn will give them more leverage in instituting firm-
99. See generally Regan, supra note 76.
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wide policies and procedures with which high-revenue lawyers are more
likely to comply.
This analysis suggests that the desire to attract non-lawyer
investment may reduce the influence of highly profitable partners vis a
vis the firm. The corresponding increase in the firm's influence of
course could be used for good or ill, depending on the aims of those who
hold the levers of power.
There's a good argument, however, that on balance the current
influence of rainmakers amplifies the market pressures that firms feel,
and that a reduction in that influence could at least make more feasible
the adoption of policies informed by other values. The emphasis on PPP,
for instance, is based mainly on the desire to remain competitive in the
lateral market. If that market comes to cast a smaller shadow and firms
are able to build more firm-specific capital, firms may be less reluctant to
invest in professional training and development because it will be more
likely that lawyers will stay long enough for such investments to pay off.
This of course also furthers the welfare of the individual lawyers who
receive such attention.
Efforts to attract non-lawyer investment thus could create incentives
to build firm-specific capital that provides a firm with some buffer from
forces in the lateral partner market. This could offer a space in which to
promote non-financial values that enhance the experiences of lawyers
within the firm.
C. Externality Concerns
What about the risk that pressure in firms to maximize the value of
their shares will lead law firms to pursue client's interests regardless of
lawyers' duties to the court, the legal system, and society? The argument
is that the corporate scandals of the last few years have already shown us
that lawyers trying to hold on to clients in a fiercely competitive market
may do their clients' bidding even when it's wrong to do so. This
pressure will be even more intense when the result of losing a client
could be a drop in the investment value of the firm.
Again, we have to ask ourselves how much greater the pressure will
be than under current circumstances, when PPP is such an important
metric. Will firms' incentives be dramatically different from what they
are now?
The market likely won't be as effective in making sure that lawyers
fulfill their duties to the legal system as it will be in making sure that
lawyers look after client interests. There's no party who represents the
interest of the legal system or society as a whole that consistently can
exert the influence that a major client can.
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That difference is a function of the competitive market for legal
services, however, rather than the organizational form of the law firm.
How likely will concern for share value increase this difference? Will it
be enough categorically to insist that the current prohibition remain?
Our experience with publicly owned corporations suggests that
concern for share price can place significant pressure on behavior. There
is a well-established body of work criticizing the incentives that are
created by a relentless focus on this metric. PPP is calculated annually,
but share price is reported every day. Law firms currently determine
their financial condition annually, but publicly traded companies must
report quarterly. Joining at least the ranks of publicly traded companies
thus could incrementally lead law firms to adopt a shorter-term
perspective that increases pressure to disregard externalities.
At the same time, the existence of a robust ethical infrastructure
within a firm can counter some of these pressures. Such an infrastructure
consists not only of firm-wide policies and procedures, but of a credible
commitment by management to professional ideals and values. A major
challenge to the creation and maintenance of these programs, however, is
the relative ease with which profitable partners can leave the firm.
Partners in management positions, law firm counsel who deal with ethics
and liability, and law firm insurers consistently lament how difficult it
can be for firms effectively to monitor and influence lawyers accustomed
to regarding themselves as portable law practices. An active lateral
market effectively reinforces profitability as a major constraint on any
effort to promote non-financial values within the firm. If firms are able
to build more firm-specific capital because of the need to attract
investors, they could gain more leverage over their lawyers' behavior
and temper the force of this constraint.
This leverage could of course be a mixed blessing, depending on the
values of those who run a given firm. Firms could use it to push even
more effectively for behavior that gives priority to financial performance.
Even firms that have a genuine commitment to broader professional
values will continue to be subject to intense competitive forces, which
could lead them to establish reward systems that slight those values. In
both cases, lawyers may have an incentive to look the other way when
clients impose harm on third parties or the legal system.
A focus on share value rather than Profits per Partner thus could
give firms some respite from the pressures of the lateral market, but there
is no guarantee that they will use it to be more attentive to larger social
values. Outside investment may create the possibility of a greater sense
of social responsibility, but it cannot ensure it. Just as with any business,
the need for competitive survival will necessarily influence the amount
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of weight that a law firm can give to interests beyond its own and those
of its clients.
Where does that leave us? Perhaps surprisingly, outside investment
will not automatically lead firms to give short shrift to social values-
and could even promote greater fidelity to them. Even if the likely
practical impact of such investment is indeterminate, however,
permitting it could have symbolic importance that prompts a more
searching discussion of lawyer regulation.
V. TOWARD A REGULATED INDUSTRY MODEL
Perhaps the most important consequence of allowing outside
investment in law firms is that it would serve as a powerful
acknowledgment that law firms are business enterprises. It may seem
ludicrous to suggest that we haven't reached this point yet, given the
widespread attention to law firm financial metrics in the legal, business,
and popular media. Law firm practice by any measure is big business.
Yet to how many other industries do we permit the privilege of self-
regulation?
The persistence of the self-regulatory model suggests that we still
haven't come to grips with the business and organizational realities of
the legal profession. We put most of our faith in the virtue of lawyers,
both as individuals and as a collective, as if proper socialization and
character were all that's necessary in order to balance complex business
and professional demands. Thus, for instance, in all but two states, ethics
rules are directed solely at individual lawyers, despite the increasing
importance of organizational structures in shaping behavior.
Notwithstanding law firms' adoption of many features of the corporation,
our regulatory system is still premised on the assumptions of the classic
partnership model and the oligopolistic market conditions under which it
emerged and thrived.
As we have seen, the classic partnership model has lost much of its
salience as competition in legal services has intensified. Firms have
responded to competition by abandoning major features of that model.
Those elements that remain have been seriously weakened in their ability
to serve the functions that the model historically was intended to serve.
Put simply, law firm behavior is now powerfully shaped by market
forces, leaving firms with less latitude to take account of other
considerations in daily and strategic decision-making by the lawyers
within them.
It's precisely this prominent influence of competitive market forces
that leads society to reject self-regulation as the model for other business
enterprises. No matter how well-intentioned, entities that operate in such
markets must necessarily assign significant weight to financial
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considerations in order to survive. Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume
that they can be completely trusted on their own to give sufficient
attention to broader interests and to police their own behavior.'00
As law firms move closer to other businesses in both form and
substance, this logic increasingly is applicable to them as well. Limiting
ownership of law firms to non-lawyers, however, permits the pretense
that self-regulation by lawyers is a viable strategy that distinguishes law
firms from other economic enterprises. Eliminating this restriction thus
could force us to confront more squarely the tensions-as well as
possible complementarities-between market competition and
professional values.
Regardless of how many firms actually seek outside investors, their
authority to do so thus would make more tenable the application of a
regulated industry model to the legal profession. This model need not
assimilate law practice to all other businesses-lawyers do have
important obligations that most market actors do not. Nor need it rely on
a classic command and control philosophy of regulation. Measures
adopted under the rubric of the "New Governance" paradigm are more
flexible, and feature more informal interaction between regulator and
regulated entity, than a traditional government-centered approach. These
include "negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, performance-
based rules, decentralized and dynamic problem solving, disclosure
regimes, and coordinated information collection."' 0'1
One form that regulation could take, for instance, is what Ted
Schneyer has called "bar corporatism." 10 2 Schneyer uses this term to
describe one way in which regulation of financial institution lawyers
might evolve in light of crises such as the widespread savings and loan
failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. 10 3  Bank regulatory agencies
asserted authority during this period to sanction lawyers whom the
agencies believed had failed to fulfill their professional
responsibilities. 10 4 Schneyer suggests that such agencies are in the best
position to establish practice protocols that provide sufficient notice of
what behavior will be required of lawyers for regulated entities.10 5 As
occurred with many of the banking agency initiatives, however,
Schneyer expects that there will be vigorous debate and discussion with
100. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
101. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINhN. L. REV. 342, 345 (2004).
102. Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis
Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 658 (1994).
103. Id. at 640-43.
104. Id. at 640-43, 646 n. 31.
105. Id. at 643, 648-49.
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the bar in the process of adopting such measures.'0 6 While the bar may
lose its purported monopoly over professional governance, it still will
"exert its influence in tandem with federal regulators."10 7
The Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") adoption of
the Rules Governing Lawyers Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission, under the authority of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation,
reflects a version of this process. 10 8 The SEC published proposed rules
in January 2003 that imposed responsibilities on securities lawyers to
report evidence of possible wrongdoing to higher authority within a
company.10 9 The rules elicited considerable commentary from the bar,
especially concerning a requirement that a lawyer who reported
suspected wrongdoing to a company's board but received an inadequate
response disclose her suspicions to the SEC." 0 The SEC withdrew this
provision in the final rules, and eliminated or revised other portions of
the rules in response to comments.11 To date, the agency has not
brought any action against an attorney for violation of the rules.
A hybrid model of regulatory collaboration between an independent
commission and professional groups could be another useful model. The
system in the UK, for instance, may evolve in this direction, with the
newly-created Legal Services Board setting standards for professional
bodies' exercise of the authority that the Board delegates to them. A new
Office of Legal Complaints will take over complaint handling from
professional groups, and these groups must separate their regulatory and
professional advocacy functions.
Many elements of the bar are likely to resist the move to a regulated
industry model, claiming that only self-regulation can ensure
professional independence. A reflexive, categorical insistence on
preserving monopoly power, however, should not substitute for a
thoughtful analysis of how specific values can be promoted by particular
regulatory arrangements.
To begin with, it's important to recognize that self-regulation has
never been as preemptive and uncontested as the bar has wished. State
legislatures periodically pass legislation that regulates the legal
profession. Dissatisfaction with bar oversight also has prompted some
government regulation of lawyers on the federal level. Banking lawyers
are subject to rules established by banking and financial institutions
106. Id. at 643.
107. Schneyer, supra note 102, at 643.
108. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 307 (2002).
109. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, SEC Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868, 17 CFR pt. 205 (Jan. 2003).
110. Id.
111. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 108.
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regulatory agencies. The Internal Revenue Service's Circular 230
imposes obligations on lawyers involved in tax practice. The Securities
and Exchange Commission has promulgated the rules on reporting to
higher authority mentioned above. Those rules apply to lawyers
appearing and practicing before the Commission, but in practice both law
firms and corporate legal departments treat them as applicable to all
lawyers. In addition, common law and statutory liability rules serve as
perhaps the main practical source of "regulation" of lawyers who provide
services to corporate clients. 1 2 Finally, the requirements of insurance
carriers also can serve effectively to govern lawyer conduct in significant
ways."1
3
Moreover, the claim that state supreme courts have inherent and
exclusive authority to regulate the legal profession is contested, and in
any event fails to justify across-the-board self-regulation. Until the late-
nineteenth century, courts in most states "were content to consider
individual cases and let the legislature set general rules."' 1 4 After that
point, courts began to assert authority based on separation of powers
principles, but that claim has not been subject to sustained inspection or
debate, nor has it been uniformly regarded as persuasive. Furthermore,
even if this claim were plausible, it applies most directly only to
litigation, not to the wide range of other work that lawyers perform. Nor
have courts been especially diligent in exercising an oversight role.
Establishing professional rules has been a low priority for courts, which
for the most part have delegated the function to bar associations.
The bar also is likely to object that a regulated industry model
would threaten the ability of the legal profession to serve as a buffer
between government and citizens. Gillian Hadfield has noted that "[t]he
origins of American professional regulation" lie in "the vision of the role
of the lawyer as a fundamental guardian of the Constitution, democracy,
and individual rights. ...
As Hadfield observes, however, protecting constitutional liberties
does not provide the justification for all rules that the bar has adopted."16
112. MILTON C. REGAN, JR. & JEFFREY BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND CORPORATE
PRACTICE 366-404 (2005).
113. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law
Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1996).
114. Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of
Law: An HistoricalAnalysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 533 (1983).
115. Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1729
(2008).
116. See id. at 1702-06 (discussing the history, advantages, disadvantages and current
issues concerning balancing the political function of the law and the economic function
of the law).
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Much of the work of lawyers is devoted not to curbing the power of the
state, but to promoting efficient market transactions, innovation,
production, and trade." 7  For purposes of regulatory design, these
functions raise different issues, and require consideration of different sets
of values.' 8 Some current rules stifle economic innovation and make
legal services more expensive without vindicating any basic democratic
values.'1 9 Dismantling a system of categorical self-regulation would
allow a more explicit discussion of which rules intend to promote which
objectives, as well as an evaluation of how well they do so.
This leads to a broader point. We want the legal profession to serve
a variety of values, not simply one. We do want lawyers to provide
protection against state overreaching. We also, however, want them to
provide affordable legal services, make dispute resolution proceed
reasonably smoothly, and impart to clients a sense of respect for the law,
among other things. There's a good argument that determining how best
to balance and promote these aims should be accomplished through a
publicly accountable democratic process, rather than a system under
which lawyers decide which rules should govern them without any
involvement by from the rest of society.120 That deliberation will need to
take account of issues such as relative institutional capacity, what
safeguards might be necessary to prevent undue state encroachment on
the ability of lawyers to serve their clients, and which restrictions on
commercial activity genuinely serve social values. 2 ' The important
point is that such a process would be far more productive than reflexive
deference to lawyer self-regulation.
Finally, we need to consider the concern that moving from a self-
regulatory to a regulated industry model would cause the capacity for
ethical deliberation to wither among lawyers. One might argue that the
practice of self-regulation fosters a sense of professional responsibility
based on the notion of the lawyer as an autonomous moral agent, whose
actions are the product of self-governance rather than responses to
external compulsion. Participation in discussions within the legal
community about how to reconcile competing values and which
obligations to assume helps refine lawyers' ethical judgment and
117. Id. at 1702.
118. Id.
119. See generally id. at 1702-06 (discussing the history, advantages, disadvantages
and current issues concerning balancing the political function of the law and the
economic function of the law).
120. See Wilkins, supra note 75, at 844-46 (discussing the legislative controls
argument for enforcing professional norms).
121. Seeid. at 819-20.
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practical reason. 122 The reality may not always match the aspiration, but
self-regulation serves as a powerful expression of the capacities to which
lawyers aspire.
By contrast, the argument goes, a regulated industry model
conceptualizes the lawyer as a self-interested actor whose behavior must
be constrained by society as a whole. This actor can't be trusted to seek
the public good on his own, so we must influence behavior by imposing
penalties for failing to do so. This diminishes the lawyer's sense that she
is an autonomous moral actor, and limits occasions for the kind of
reflective deliberation that can help refine ethical judgment.
One response to this argument is that the legal profession has
moved from regulations framed in open-ended terms that require the
exercise of discretion to black letter rules that are intended to provide
explicit notice of what behavior is prohibited. 123 The profession itself
thus appears to be skeptical of the educative potential of self-regulation.
Second, there are perils in extending the analogy of individual self-
governance to the collective level. Deliberation by an individual
involves reconciling conflicting impulses, values, and interests within a
single subject. Collective deliberation involves both that process and the
accommodation of these concerns among multiple subjects. The latter
inevitably raises issues of power, rationality, 24 and scale that weaken,
even if they do not fully discredit, the analogy to individual deliberation.
Next, it is misguided to think of regulation by society as an
"externally" imposed constraint. This rests on an impoverished sense of
individual autonomy and an asocial conception of professional
autonomy. A sense of individual identity that is the predicate for
conceptualizing autonomy ineluctably rests on relationships with others
and social practices such as reciprocity. 125 The notion of professional
identity reflects the need for certain individuals to serve social purposes
through the performance of a social role. The professional autonomy of
lawyers makes sense only in a society governed by the rule of law. The
existence of laws regulating the profession thus is not an external
imposition of alien restrictions, but a social practice that is internal to the
kind of community in which the idea of lawyer autonomy is a
meaningful value.
122. On practical reason, see ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
123. See generally Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to
Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273 (1998).
124. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d
ed. 1970).
125. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY (1979); CHARLES
TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1992).
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Finally, we do need to take seriously the concern that adoption of a
regulated industry model might subtly reshape lawyers' self-conceptions.
Specifically, the fear is that lawyers may abandon the ideal of themselves
as professionals charged with some measure of social responsibility, and
adopt in its place an identity as simply another group of self-interested
actors. They may interpret their ethical behavior as compliance with
regulation rather than as freely chosen action that expresses their values.
The lawyer's former understanding of his or her own motivation would
be a less durable foundation for desirable conduct than would the
latter. 12
6
First, it is an open question how much lawyers currently conceive of
themselves as professionals charged with social obligations. There is
substantial criticism that, notwithstanding the dominance of self-
regulation, lawyers have abandoned broader commitments for the sake of
commercial gain.127 I will assume for the purposes of this discussion,
however, that enough lawyers have retained a sense of public
responsibility to raise concern about the possibility of its loss.
One response to the fear that lawyers' self-conceptions will be
changed for the worse is that the types of new governance initiatives that
I have described 128 involve collaboration, self-monitoring and shared
responsibility that can prompt attribution of motives to internal values
rather than self-interested responses to externally-imposed constraints.
A more fundamental response is that the concern about lawyer self-
understanding implicitly rests on acceptance of the traditional dichotomy
between law as a profession and law as a business. According to this
dichotomy, as members of a profession that engages in self-regulation
lawyers are assumed to act on the basis of internalized professional
values. Ethical conduct therefore is the expression of these values. As
participants in business, they are assumed to act in accordance with self-
interest. Ethical behavior therefore occurs only when the law makes
unethical conduct too costly.
We can recognize that law is a business, however, without accepting
the view that this nullifies its status as a profession. We need a more
complex account of market actors, including lawyers, that incorporates
the notion that they are capable of being moved by a sense of social
126. See, e.g., Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems,
Decision Frames, and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 684 (1999); David M. Messick,
Alternative Logics for Decision Making in Social Settings, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 11
(1998); Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An
Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 746 (1997).
127. See, e.g., Sol M. Linowitz, The BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
128. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
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responsibility even as they must respond to competitive forces.
Exploring under what circumstances this is likely to occur will help
determine the mix of regulatory approaches that is appropriate in various
contexts. Movement to a regulated industry model may prompt this kind
of reassessment. Such a reassessment in turn could influence lawyers'
understandings of their own responsibilities and motivations. There is no
guarantee that all of this will happen. It is sufficiently plausible,
however, to call into question the claim that movement to a regulated
industry model would inevitably result in an impoverished understanding
.among lawyers of their role in society.
VI. CONCLUSION
The assumption of organizational self-governance under the classic
partnership model has provided support for the claim to self-governance
by the legal profession as a whole. Both emphasize professional
socialization and virtuous character as the key mechanisms for balancing
the financial and professional demands that lawyers face. These
mechanisms had some plausibility in an oligopolistic market for legal
services, in which firms could publicly efface business considerations
and emphasize their commitment to professional ideals.
Currently, market conditions are radically different. Firms no
longer conform to the classic partnership model, and the strategy of self-
regulation faces increasing difficulty in reconciling financial and
professional concerns. The power of the model persists, however, and
restrictions on law firms that do not apply to other business enterprises
lend support to it. We need more carefully to consider which of these
restrictions are justified and which are not. I have suggested that non-
lawyer investment will not necessarily threaten traditional professional
values, and that it may in fact provide incentives and opportunities to
reinforce them. Most notably, permitting firms to obtain outside
investment could represent an important symbolic step toward rethinking
how the United States legal profession should be regulated. These
thoughts admittedly are speculative, but they suggest at a minimum that
we should follow developments in England, Wales, and Australia with an
open mind.
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